CCI Closes Adani–SECI Solar Tender Case: No Prima Facie Bid Rigging or Abuse of Dominance

On 16 April 2026, the Competition Commission of India closed a complaint alleging bid rigging and abuse of dominance against Adani Enterprises Ltd, Adani Green Energy Ltd, Azure Power India Private Limited, Solar Energy Corporation of India Ltd (SECI), and several state distribution utilities in relation to SECI’s 2019 tender for 7 GW of manufacturing-linked solar capacity. In a detailed order under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act, 2002, a bench comprising Chairperson Ravneet Kaur and Members Anil Agrawal, Sweta Kakkad, and Deepak Anurag held that the informant had failed to make out a prima facie case of contravention of Section 3 or Section 4 of the Act. The CCI Adani SECI solar tender closure is a significant datapoint on where the effects-based standard draws the line between standard procurement design and anti-competitive tender structuring in India’s renewable energy sector.

Key Takeaways

• The CCI closed the Adani–SECI matter on 16 April 2026 under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act, 2002, finding no prima facie case under Sections 3 or 4 of the Act.
• The complaint by informant Ravi Sharma had alleged bid rigging, cover bidding by Azure Power for Adani, tender design favouring large players, abuse of dominance by the Adani Group, and bribery tied to US DoJ/SEC indictment allegations.
• The underlying 2019 SECI tender sought 7 GW of ISTS-connected solar PV capacity tied to 2 GW of annual domestic solar manufacturing, with tariffs capped at ₹2.93/kWh for 25 years.
• On Section 4, the Commission held that the Adani Group, prima facie, is not a dominant player in the Indian power generation market, citing the presence of NTPC, Power Grid, Tata Power, Torrent Power, Reliance Power, JSW Energy, and Suzlon Energy.
• On Section 3, the Commission found no evidence supporting the claim that Azure Power acted as a cover bidder for Adani Green Energy, and no cogent material indicating collusive tender design.
• The Commission upheld SECI’s tender design, including the Green Shoe Option and transferred-capacity clauses, as falling within procurer autonomy; the Green Shoe Option was noted to have been approved by CERC in Petition No. 286/AT/2021.
• Bribery allegations derived from pending US criminal and civil proceedings were held to fall outside the scope of Section 4 of the Competition Act.

The Complaint: Allegations of Rigged Procurement and Market Abuse

The informant, Ravi Sharma, brought a wide-ranging information under Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002 targeting not just Adani Enterprises Ltd (OP-1) and Adani Green Energy Ltd (OP-2), but Gautam Adani and Sagar Adani personally (OP-3 and OP-4), Azure Power India Private Limited (OP-5), SECI (OP-6), and a group of state distribution companies (OP-7 to OP-12) that had entered into power sale agreements tied to the tendered capacity. The core allegations fell into five categories.

First, that SECI’s Request for Selection issued in June 2019 — which invited bids for 7 GW of ISTS-connected solar PV projects tied to 2 GW of annual solar manufacturing — was structured through clauses such as the Green Shoe Option and transferred-capacity provisions to favour large incumbents like Adani and Azure while excluding smaller players. Second, that Azure Power’s later surrender of 2,333 MW of awarded capacity (1,799 MW in 2023 and a further 700 MW in 2024) was effectively a staged handover to Adani, suggesting a pre-arranged “cover bidding” design contravening Section 3. Third, that the Adani Group leveraged vertical-integration synergies — access to group capital through Adani Power and Adani Transmission, land holdings, and transmission-corridor advantages — to achieve exclusionary growth abusive of dominance under Section 4. Fourth, that discriminatory power purchase arrangements and tariff structures reinforced cross-subsidies within the group. Fifth, that a United States Department of Justice indictment and Securities and Exchange Commission civil action against Gautam Adani and Sagar Adani, alleging bribery to secure Indian PSA contracts with state distribution utilities via SECI, supplied evidence of a sham procurement scheme.

The 2019 SECI Tender: Design and Allocation Structure

SECI, a Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) public sector undertaking acting as a central procurement intermediary under the Electricity Act, 2003, floated the impugned Request for Selection in June 2019. The tender was structured in two packages (A and B) for 7 GW of ISTS-connected solar PV capacity, linked to a commitment on the part of bidders to establish 2 GW of annual domestic solar manufacturing capacity. The structure followed the Tariff-Based Competitive Bidding (TBCB) framework, adopted tariffs regulated by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC), and power sale agreements approved by respective State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs). The tender was floated three times, with the first two iterations annulled, before reaching award in the form ultimately challenged.

Two design features attracted particular scrutiny. The Green Shoe Option allowed successful bidders to be awarded additional capacity above their original bid quantum, with tariff adjustments that had the effect of reducing consumer cost. The transferred-capacity clause permitted capacity originally allocated to one bidder to be reallocated where that bidder could not take it up, subject to regulatory approvals. In the complaint’s telling, these mechanisms together funnelled capacity to large players; in SECI’s submission, which the CCI accepted, they were standard procurement design adopted in accordance with MNRE directives and upheld by CERC.

Section 3 Analysis: The Cover-Bidding Claim Fails

Section 3(3)(d) of the Competition Act, 2002 presumes anti-competitive effect in respect of bid-rigging or collusive bidding agreements among competitors. The informant sought to bring the Azure–Adani relationship within this presumption by arguing that Azure’s subsequent surrender of 2,333 MW of awarded capacity was not a genuine commercial withdrawal but a pre-arranged handover that transferred economic benefit to Adani under the guise of regulatory process.

The Commission rejected this formulation on evidentiary grounds. The order recorded that the informant failed to produce cogent evidence that Azure Power was acting as a cover bidder for Adani Green Energy at the time of the 2019 bids, or that the later capacity surrenders were coordinated between the two entities. Azure’s surrenders had been explained by reference to public interest litigation before the Andhra Pradesh High Court, conditions imposed by CERC in related matters, and lender-side constraints — commercial explanations that the CCI found credible absent contrary material. The Section 3(3)(d) presumption, while powerful, still requires a foundational finding of agreement or coordination, and the informant’s submissions did not supply a plausible basis for that inference.

Section 4 Analysis: The Dominance Question

The Section 4 analysis turned on a definitional question that the informant’s submissions did not adequately address: what is the relevant market in which Adani is alleged to be dominant? The complaint’s framing implied a relevant market of “solar power generation in India”, but the CCI observed that the broader power generation sector — spanning thermal, solar, wind, and hydro sources — is the operating competitive canvas, populated by NTPC Ltd, Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd, Tata Power Ltd, Torrent Power Ltd, and Reliance Power Ltd in the generalist tier, with JSW Energy Ltd and Suzlon Energy Ltd as additional significant renewable-focused players. The Adani Group’s 16% private power share (cited by the informant) — even if extended to 40% including thermal generation — did not translate into a prima facie dominant position in that wider market.

The Commission’s reasoning tracks the effects-based standard reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in CCI v. Schott Glass India Pvt Ltd (September 2025). Section 4 is not a strict-liability regime. It requires a defined relevant market under Section 2(s) and 2(t), a finding of dominance within that market using the Section 19(4) factors, and a demonstration of conduct that produces or is likely to produce an appreciable adverse effect on competition. The Adani complaint failed at the first step: without a defensible market definition, the dominance finding necessary for Section 4 analysis could not be sustained.

On the allegation of vertical-integration abuse — that Adani leveraged group synergies across generation, transmission, and financing to foreclose competitors — the Commission observed that such allegations require a relational analysis mapping how dominance in one relevant market is used to protect or enter another (the Section 4(2)(e) leveraging test). The informant’s submissions neither identified a market of dominance nor a market of effect, leaving the conceptual architecture of the claim incomplete.

Procurer Autonomy and the Limits of Tender-Design Scrutiny

A significant thread in the order concerns the extent to which a public-sector procurer’s tender design can itself be scrutinised as anti-competitive conduct. The CCI has previously held, in Case No. 22 of 2018, Case No. 69 of 2016, and Case No. 38 of 2023, that eligibility criteria tied to capacity, financial strength, and performance track record are part of the procurer’s legitimate design authority and do not become anti-competitive merely because smaller players are disadvantaged. The Commission applied the same principle here: stipulating capacity thresholds and financial eligibility is standard industry practice, and the fact that the RfS conditions favoured bidders who could credibly deliver at 7 GW scale and 2 GW manufacturing commitment does not, by itself, amount to abuse.

The Green Shoe Option received similar treatment. The Commission noted that CERC had considered and upheld the Green Shoe Option in Petition No. 286/AT/2021, emphasising that the mechanism led to downward tariff revisions — a consumer-welfare outcome consistent with the objectives of the Competition Act. Where a regulatory authority has specifically evaluated and approved a procurement design feature, the CCI will require more than assertion to overturn that finding on competition-law grounds.

US Indictment Allegations: Outside Section 4 Scope

The most distinctive feature of the order is its treatment of the US DoJ and SEC proceedings. The informant had urged the Commission to treat the bribery allegations against Gautam Adani and Sagar Adani — contained in a US criminal indictment and civil action concerning alleged payments to state officials to secure PSAs — as probative material for Section 4 contravention. The CCI declined to do so on a jurisdictional footing. Bribery and related conduct, the Commission observed, falls outside the scope of Section 4 of the Competition Act, which is concerned with abuse of dominance through commercial conduct in defined relevant markets. Allegations of corruption are addressed under distinct statutory regimes — the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and the PMLA framework in the ordinary course — and their existence does not transform an otherwise lawful tender process into a Section 4 contravention.

This is an analytically clean distinction. The CCI is not the forum for investigating whether foreign bribery occurred; nor is its reach over foreign indictments relevant to an India-specific Section 4 analysis. The rejection of the bribery-to-dominance bridge is consistent with the Commission’s long-standing position that Section 4 requires proof of competitive harm within a defined relevant market, not a general inquiry into corporate conduct writ large.

Cross-Practice Impact

For competition and antitrust practices, the order is a structured illustration of the prima-facie threshold for Section 26(2) closures. The case is useful precedent for defending complaints that rely on aggregated factual allegations without a defensible market definition or a specific evidentiary bridge between dominance and conduct. Where a complaint is pleaded in broad terms across Sections 3 and 4 simultaneously, the CCI is prepared to test each limb against its own evidentiary threshold.

For energy, infrastructure, and renewables practices, the order clarifies that standard procurement design features in tenders floated by central PSUs under MNRE and Electricity Act frameworks — including capacity-linked eligibility criteria, Green Shoe Options, transferred-capacity clauses, and TBCB tariff-adoption mechanics — will not, in themselves, sustain a Section 3 or Section 4 challenge. The order should inform bid-defence strategies in future competition-law challenges to renewable-energy tenders, including pending and upcoming tenders for round-the-clock (RTC) power, storage-linked capacity, and hybrid renewable projects.

For corporate and securities counsel advising large Indian groups — including those headquartered in Ahmedabad and across Gujarat’s industrial ecosystem, where significant infrastructure and renewables development is concentrated — the order carries two governance implications. First, competition-law exposure from public procurement is materially lower where the procurement design has received CERC, SERC, or MNRE approval along the way. Second, foreign criminal or civil proceedings — including US DoJ/SEC actions — will not, on the CCI’s current approach, automatically translate into domestic competition-law liability, though the underlying conduct remains exposed under India’s anti-corruption, securities, and economic-offence regimes.

For public-procurement counsel, the order provides a useful formulation of procurer autonomy: tender design is the prerogative of the procuring entity, subject to regulatory sectoral oversight, and will not be second-guessed by the CCI absent specific evidence of coordination or exclusionary design unsupported by objective commercial rationale.

Precedent Trajectory and the Section 26(2) Filter

Section 26(2) is the CCI’s gateway filter: if the Commission is of the view that there is no prima facie case, it closes the matter at the information stage without ordering a Director General investigation. The provision is deliberately upstream of merits adjudication, designed to prevent resource-intensive investigations in cases where the informant has not cleared the threshold of alleging a plausible contravention supported by evidence.

Recent Section 26(2) orders have tended to favour closure where (i) the relevant market is inadequately defined, (ii) the allegations of dominance are unsupported by market-share or Section 19(4)-factor analysis, or (iii) the alleged conduct is characterised in the abstract without linkage to specific contractual or commercial behaviour. The Adani–SECI order reflects all three patterns. The closure does not, however, foreclose future information in different factual settings — the same conduct, on a different record, may well cross the prima facie threshold in a properly pleaded complaint.

Looking Ahead

The Adani–SECI closure sits within a broader trend of effects-based discipline at the CCI: in Schott Glass the Supreme Court reaffirmed the standard; in the Google Android appeal the NCLAT recalibrated penalty on effects-based grounds; and in the pending Intel appeal the NCLAT stay is likely to test the same principle in the after-sales service context. The 16 April 2026 closure is another datapoint in this arc — an institutional signal that the CCI’s Section 26(2) gateway will filter out complaints that do not clear the conceptual and evidentiary bar for Section 3 or Section 4 contravention, regardless of the profile of the parties involved.

An informant dissatisfied with a Section 26(2) closure may appeal to the NCLAT under Section 53B of the Competition Act, 2002. Whether Ravi Sharma takes that route, and whether the NCLAT agrees with the Commission’s dominance and relevant-market analyses, will determine whether the closure is a final word or an intermediate station. Pending that, the order supplies immediate working clarity for compliance and litigation strategy in India’s energy procurement landscape.

Frequently Asked Questions

What did the CCI rule in the Adani–SECI solar tender matter on 16 April 2026?

A bench comprising Chairperson Ravneet Kaur and Members Anil Agrawal, Sweta Kakkad, and Deepak Anurag closed a complaint alleging bid rigging and abuse of dominance against Adani Enterprises Ltd, Adani Green Energy Ltd, Azure Power India Pvt Ltd, SECI, and several state distribution utilities. The order, passed under Section 26(2) of the Competition Act, 2002, held that the informant had not established a prima facie case of contravention of Sections 3 or 4 of the Act, and the matter was closed without further investigation.

What is Section 26(2) of the Competition Act, 2002?

Section 26(2) of the Competition Act, 2002 empowers the Competition Commission of India to close a case at the threshold stage if, upon considering the information, the Commission is of the opinion that there exists no prima facie case. Closure under Section 26(2) is not a finding on merits — it is a gateway filter that prevents resource-intensive Director General investigations in cases where the informant has not crossed the prima facie threshold. An aggrieved informant may appeal the closure before the NCLAT under Section 53B of the Act.

Why did the CCI find that the Adani Group is not dominant in power generation?

The Commission observed that India’s power generation sector spans thermal, solar, wind, and hydro sources and is populated by multiple significant public and private players — including NTPC Ltd, Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd, Tata Power Ltd, Torrent Power Ltd, Reliance Power Ltd, JSW Energy Ltd, and Suzlon Energy Ltd. Against that market backdrop, the Adani Group’s share — even including thermal generation — did not translate into a prima facie dominant position. The informant also failed to define the relevant market or apply the Section 19(4) factors, which are prerequisites for any Section 4 analysis.

What was the Green Shoe Option in the SECI tender, and why did the CCI uphold it?

The Green Shoe Option in the 2019 SECI tender permitted successful bidders to be awarded additional capacity above their original bid quantum, with tariff adjustments. The Commission upheld the mechanism on the basis that it was a standard procurement design feature adopted under MNRE directive, that it resulted in downward tariff revisions beneficial to consumers, and that the CERC had itself considered and approved the Green Shoe Option in Petition No. 286/AT/2021. The CCI relied on its earlier rulings in Case No. 22 of 2018, Case No. 69 of 2016, and Case No. 38 of 2023 to affirm that procurement eligibility criteria fall within procurer autonomy and are not anti-competitive per se.

Did the US DoJ indictment against Gautam and Sagar Adani affect the CCI’s analysis?

No. The Commission held that allegations of bribery — including those arising from US DoJ criminal and SEC civil proceedings concerning payments to secure Indian power sale agreements — fall outside the scope of Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002. Section 4 addresses abuse of dominance through commercial conduct in defined relevant markets, not allegations of corruption, which are governed by separate statutes including the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Can the complainant appeal the Section 26(2) closure?

Yes. Under Section 53B of the Competition Act, 2002, any person aggrieved by an order passed by the CCI under Section 26(2) may file an appeal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal within 60 days of communication of the order. The NCLAT may affirm, modify, or set aside the closure order. A further appeal lies to the Supreme Court under Section 53T on a question of law.

What are the implications of this order for future renewable energy tenders in India?

The order confirms that standard procurement design features in central PSU renewable-energy tenders — including capacity-linked eligibility, Green Shoe Options, transferred-capacity clauses, and TBCB tariff-adoption mechanics — will not, without more, sustain a Section 3 or Section 4 challenge. Complainants will need to show defined relevant markets, dominance within those markets, and specific evidence of coordination or exclusionary conduct. For developers, PSU procurers, and counsel advising on upcoming RTC, hybrid, and storage-linked tenders, the order provides meaningful working clarity.

About This Analysis

This analysis has been prepared by the Candour Legal Team. Candour Legal is an analytical commercial law practice based in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, with a focus on competition law, energy and infrastructure regulation, direct tax, corporate and commercial law, and regulatory advisory. Views expressed are general in nature and for informational purposes only; they are not legal advice and should not be relied upon in any specific matter without advice on the facts.